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INTRODUCTION
Diagnostic methods offer a tremendous value to our society, with
benefits that usually far exceed their costs. Physicians and laboratory
technicians use diagnostic methods to determine the presence of diseases or disorders without having to perform expensive surgery. A
series of non-invasive steps, such as obtaining a sample from a patient, running tests on the sample, and interpreting results, is one example of a simple diagnostic method that can yield essential treatment
information. A recent study shows that, while diagnostic methods
comprise about 5 percent of hospital costs and about 1.6 percent of all
Medicare costs, their results may influence up to 60–70 percent of
health-care decision-making.1 There is a noticeably high benefit-tocost ratio when performing diagnostic methods that warrants our attention to their future development and implementation in health care.
1

LEWIN GROUP, THE VALUE OF DIAGNOSTICS INNOVATION, ADOPTION AND
DIFFUSION
INTO
HEALTH
CARE
147,
148
(July
2005),
http://www.advamed.org/NR/rdonlyres/61EB858F-EC9E-4FAB-954709DABF7D2A72/0/thevalueofdiagnostics.pdf.
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Unfortunately, the benefits of diagnostic methods have been
diminished by increased competition to develop the most lucrative
tests.2 Corporations involved in the diagnostic market have placed a
“heavy reliance” on obtaining patent protection in order to recoup
money spent on research and development.3 Patents enable corporations to block their competitors from making or using any diagnostic
method that is similar to a patented method.4 While aggressively
seeking patent protection may represent a wise business decision on
behalf of a diagnostic corporation, it does not take into account the
negative implications for society. Some diagnostic method patents are
overly broad and include what is arguably an exclusive right to use the
human body’s natural pathways or mental faculties.5 These sorts of
patents hinder the progress of science and medicine by imposing barriers to research and patient treatments that require access to the human body’s natural functions.6
While the purpose of the patent system is to enhance social welfare by incentivizing research and development,7 the subsequent
blocking of critical avenues of research and treatment is contrary to
this purpose, and therefore can be seen as an “unintended effect.”8
This unintended effect has been acutely recognized by pathology labs,
which routinely perform patented diagnostic methods in order to study
disease.9 The Association for Molecular Pathology (AMP) has stated
that while patents “are originally intended to provide incentives” to
conduct basic research, they have, in reality, hindered the growth of
pathology labs by imposing exorbitant licensing fees.10 The Supreme
2

See John Carrol, Convergence in the Midst of Competition,
BIOTECHNOLOGY HEALTHCARE 31–32, 38–39 (Dec. 2007).
3
See LEWIN GROUP, supra note 1, at 62.
4
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).
5
See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124,
135–38 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588
(1978)).
6
See id. at 126–27 (“[S]ometimes too much patent protection can impede
rather than ‘promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”) (citation omitted).
7
STEPHEN A. MERRILL ET AL., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 39
(2004).
8
See LEWIN GROUP, supra note 1, at 62.
9
See Barbara A. Zehnbauer, Clinical Testing of Patient’s Specimens, in
MOLECULAR GENETIC TESTING IN SURGICAL PATHOLOGY 171, 184 (John D. Pfeifer
ed., 2006) (explaining that these patented diagnostic methods include genetic tests
and molecular medicine techniques).
10
Id. at 184. Laboratories that use a patented method without paying a licensing fee may be served with a cease and desist letter. See S. Chandrasekharan et
al., Impact of Gene Patents and Licensing Practices On Access to Genetic Testing for
Hereditary Hemochromatosis, 12 GENETICS MEDICINE, S155–S170 (2010). If they
create their own internal test similar to the patented method, they may be sued for
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Court11 and the American Medical Association (AMA)12 have also
identified this unintended effect on physicians who are forced to conduct extensive patent research before ordering a diagnostic test for a
patient.
This Note will attempt to reconcile the traditional role of the patent system, to provide incentives to invent, with its unintended effect
of blocking essential avenues of research and treatment. To achieve
this end, this Note will focus on what types of diagnostic methods
should be eligible for patenting. Clarifying the proper scope of patent
eligibility should prohibit patents on overly-broad diagnostic methods
while still retaining traditional incentives to invent. In Part I, I will
provide background on common diagnostic methods and the factors
affecting their development. In Part II, I will provide background on
basic patent law principles and the current legal debate over diagnostic method patent eligibility. In Part III, I will discuss two common
arguments against granting patents on diagnostic methods. In Part IV,
I will discuss the recent Prometheus decision and its effect on patent
eligibility. In Part V, I will propose a redefined version of the current
test for patent-eligible subject matter, the machine-or-transformation
test, and apply it to the diagnostic method patents at issue in recent
Federal Circuit cases.
I.

ATTRIBUTES OF DIAGNOSTIC METHODS

With each passing year, diagnostic methods are becoming more
accurate, precise, and comprehensive.13 While present diagnostic
methods have already been shown to increase patient health and reduce health-care costs,14 future tests should provide more effective
treatments that are better calibrated to treatment risks and perhaps
even tailored to individual characteristics.15 While many diagnostic
infringement. See 35 U.S.C. §271(a); Lear Siegler Inc. v. Sealy Mattress Co., 873
F.2d 1422, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (discussing the “Doctrine of Equivalents”).
11
Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 138 (noting that some diagnostic patents may
“divert resources from the medical task of health care to the legal task of searching
patent files for similar simple correlations”).
12
See Aaron S. Kesselheim & Michelle M. Mello, Medical Process Patents–
Monopolizing the Delivery of Health Care, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2036, 2036 (2006).
13
See LEWIN GROUP, supra note 1, at 42.
14
See id. at 1; this is generally true when diagnostic tests are accurate.
Sometimes diagnostics produce “false negative error[s],” where a disease is present
but undetected, and “false positive error[s],” where a disease is not present but detected. Id. at 67–68.
15
Id. at 1 (“As such products mature, clinicians and patients will be better
able to access the risks and benefits of care options and customized health management strategies to optimize individual health and quality of life.”). This has also been
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methods have yet to be implemented for consumers and health-care
providers, a few are routinely used today. Common diagnostic methods used by health-care providers include, but are not limited to, medical imaging, blood assays, and genetic tests.
A.

Examples of Diagnostic Methods

X-ray methods are a form of medical imaging used to diagnose
bone disorders. A high frequency electromagnetic signal is transmitted and becomes attenuated as it passes through the body.16 The remaining signal is captured on film for subsequent analysis.17 An
alternative to X-ray methods is Medical Resonance Imaging (MRI),
which is used to diagnose disease in soft tissues such as the brain,
muscles, and heart.18 MRI methods involve the application of a magnetic field to a patient and the transmission of radio frequency pulses.19 Resonance energy is emitted by the patient and picked up by a
receiver that outputs data onto a screen for viewing.20 To improve
image clarity, both X-rays and MRIs involve the oral or intravenous
administration of a contrast agent to a patient.21
Unlike medical imaging methods, blood assays and genetic tests
require a physical sample to be extracted from a patient.22 Blood
assays are used to identify immune response deficiencies, drug levels,
and other forms of disease.23 A typical first step is to take a blood
sample from a patient using a hypodermic syringe and needle. The
blood sample is then subjected to a number of tests involving

referred to as the “promise of personalized medicine.” See Michael O. Leavitt & Raju
Kucherlapati, Op-Ed, The Great Promise of Personalized Medicine, BOSTON GLOBE,
Dec. 26, 2008, at A19.
16
CHEST X-RAY IN CLINICAL PRACTICE 15 (Rita Joarder & Neil Crundwell
eds., 2009).
17
Id.
18
See GARY LINEY, MRI IN CLINICAL PRACTICE 11 (2006).
19
See U.S. Patent No. 6,414,488 (filed Mar. 1, 2000).
20
See id.
21
CONTRAST-ENHANCED CLINICAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING 1–2 (Val
M. Runge ed., 1997); Contrast Agents, AM. SOC’Y RADIOLOGIC TECHNOLOGISTS,
https://www.asrt.org/content/ThePublic/AboutRadiologicProcedures/ContrastAgents.
aspx (last visited Mar. 14, 2011).
22
Blood assays and genetic tests are also a form of in vitro diagnostic as they
are performed on samples extracted from the body. Medical imagine methods such as
X-ray and MRI that monitor health within the body are referred to as in vivo diagnostics. LEWIN GROUP, supra note 1, at 14.
23
See R. Hussain et al., Cytokine Profiles Using Whole-Blood Assays Can
Discriminate Between Tuberculosis Patients and Healthy Endemic Controls in a
BCG-Vaccinated Population, 264 J. IMMUNOLOGICAL METHODS 95 (2002).
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reagents.24 Test results are analyzed individually by a medical technician or in quick succession by a machine.25
Genetic tests are more complex than blood assays and are used to
diagnose diseases which can be traced to genetic alterations. Myriad’s BRACAnalysis test, for example, is used to diagnose breast cancer.26 The first step is to take a sample from a patient by drawing
blood or using a cheek swab or mouthwash.27 The sample is then sent
to Myriad for purification of specific gene fragments, amplification,
and sequencing.28 The sample sequence is compared against a reference sequence in order to make a diagnosis.29
B.

Factors Affecting Diagnostic Method Development

There are three main factors affecting the development of new diagnostic methods: administrative regulation, insurance coverage and
reimbursement policies, and industrial competition.30 The FDA regulates diagnostics similarly to medical devices by categorizing them
into three risk-based classes.31 Class I represents minimal potential
for harm, while Class III includes riskier diagnostics such as HIV test
kits.32 Class III diagnostics are placed under the most regulatory scrutiny and may be subject to a pre-market approval process.33
Diagnostics performed in a hospital setting account for 60 percent
of the diagnostic industry’s revenue;34 therefore their implementation
is highly dependent on insurance coverage and reimbursement policies. Medicare reimbursement policies often affect the policies of
other medical insurance groups because Medicare is “the largest purchaser of clinical laboratory services in the US.”35 The reimburse24
25

Id.
Id. Rapid testing of samples with a machine is known as high-throughput

screening.
26

See BRACAnalysis® Questions and Answers, MYRIAD GENETIC
LABORATORIES, https://www.myriadpro.com/node/109/anchor#brfaq1 (last visited
Mar. 6, 2012).
27
Id.
28
BRACAnalysis®
Technical
Specifications,
MYRIAD
GENETIC
LABORATORIES
1
(Feb.
2012),
http://www.myriad.com/lib/technicalspecifications/BRACAnalysis-Technical-Specifications.pdf.
29
Id.
30
LEWIN GROUP, supra note 1, at 59–63.
31
Id. at 60.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 27.
35
Id. at 61 (citing INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, MEDICARE LABORATORY
PAYMENT POLICY NOW AND IN THE FUTURE 17 (2000)).
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ment rates set by Medicare for diagnostic methods do not always correspond with development costs, and novel diagnostics are often reimbursed at rates similar to outdated tests.36 This reimbursement
structure discourages development and may hinder innovation.37
The third factor affecting diagnostic method development is competition to create the most lucrative diagnostic methods. The creation
of novel diagnostic methods involves highly technical research that is
often risky and expensive.38 To offset this risk and increase the
chance of recouping research and development costs, corporations
work extremely hard to “protect” their investments through patents.
Patent protection ensures that the corporations will benefit exclusively
from the success of their inventions for the life of the patent, which is
normally twenty years from filing.39 Patents reduce the risk inherent
in technology investments, which can aid in the search for third-party
funding.40
However, recent judicial developments may threaten corporate reliance on patent protection for diagnostic methods. In June 2010, the
Supreme Court in Bilski v. Kappos revisited what types of inventions
should be eligible to receive a patent for the first time in twenty-nine
years.41 The Court expressly invited the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent
cases, to impose new limitations on patent eligibility.42 Since Bilski,
the Federal Circuit has decided two cases which have a bearing on the
future of diagnostic method patents.43 To understand the recent
changes that have come about in patent law, the next section will provide background.

36

Id.
Id.
38
Id. at 62.
39
Id.
40
See George J. Annas, Surrogate Embryo Transfer: The Perils of Patenting,
HASTINGS CTR. REP., June 1984, at 25, 26 (Dr. Buster, the inventor of surrogate embryo transfer, states that investors would not have funded his research without a
“chance to profit from their investment via patenting and licensing the products and
processes . . . .”).
41
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3223 (2010); see Margaret Kubick, An
Uncertain Future: The Impact of Medical Process and Diagnostic Method Patents on
Healthcare in the United States, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 280–81 (2010).
42
Id. at 16.
43
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 653 F.3d 1329, 1334 (Fed.
Cir. 2011); Classen Immunotherapies v. Biogen Idec (Classen II), 659 F.3d 1057,
1059 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
37
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BASIC PATENT LAW PRINCIPLES AND THE LEGAL DEBATE
OVER DIAGNOSTIC METHOD PATENT ELIGIBILITY
A.

Patent System Foundation

The American patent system consists of a legal framework to
protect any “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter.”44 Congressional authority over patents is
granted by Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, which seeks “[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts” by granting an exclusive right to an inventor on his invention for a limited time.45
Under the utilitarian theory of patent law, this phrase has been
interpreted to protect only those inventions that enhance the nation’s
social welfare.46 In other words, a patent should provide more
incentives to create beneficial, new technologies than disincentives to
do so.
Four statutory provisions have been enacted to ensure that patents
enhance the nation’s social welfare and promote science.47 The first
provision, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (§ 101) defines patent-eligible subject matter.48 Inventions that do not come within the scope of § 101 are
deemed non-statutory and ineligible for a patent, regardless of their
other characteristics. The second provision defines novelty of
invention and how one may lose her patent rights through specific
acts.49 The third provision defines how inventions must be “nonobvious” to one having ordinary skill in the art.50 The fourth provision requires inventions be properly disclosed to the public and
described well enough that someone can make and use it.51
This Note will focus on the first provision, § 101, and more
specifically, the first of four enumerated categories within this provision: “new and useful process[es].”52 This Note will not analyze the
other three categories of § 101,53 nor will it analyze the other three
44

35 U.S.C. § 101 (2011).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
46
David S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously:
The Case for Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 184
(2009).
47
§§ 101–103, 122.
48
Id. § 101.
49
Id. § 102.
50
Id. § 103.
51
Id. § 112.
52
Id. § 101.
53
Id. (The other subject matter categories of § 101 are “any new and useful .
. . machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.”).
45
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statutory provisions,54 each of which can preclude the issuance of a
patent. While diagnostic methods may involve the use of a machine
or a patented drug, there is a single category of patent eligibility for
the “process” or method itself, which is removed from the physical
objects associated with it. For example, in Prometheus Laboratories,
Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services (Prometheus II),55 a laboratory
owned a method patent on a multi-step metabolites test that optimizes
the delivery of drugs used to treat a specific autoimmune disease.56
The laboratory’s method patent covers each step of the metabolite
test, but it does not extend to the drugs themselves, which are
unpatented and commonly used.57
B.

The Legal Debate Over Diagnostic Method Patent
Eligibility

The history of the Prometheus II decision shows that what
constitutes a patent eligible diagnostic method is currently up for debate. In this case, a clinical pathology lab associated with the Mayo
Clinic in Rochester, NY, purchased and performed Prometheus
Laboratories’ patented Thiopurine Metabolites test in order to
optimize the treatment of inflammatory bowel disease.58 A common
problem associated with treating inflammatory bowel disease is that a
small percentage of patients poorly metabolize thiopurine drugs,
which can produce toxic side effects.59 Prometheus’ Thiopurine
Metabolites test addresses this problem by minimizing toxic side
effects unique to a patient’s metabolic response.60 Since this test
relies on a patient’s individual ability to metabolize an administered
drug, it can be characterized as a personalized method.
After years of paying licensing fees, the Mayo Clinic began using
its own version of the Prometheus Thiopurine Metabolites test at its
clinics and hospitals.61 Prometheus Laboratories sued the Mayo Clin-

54

Id. § 101–103.
Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs. (Prometheus II), 628
F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
56
Id. at 1349–50.
57
See id. at 1350.
58
See id. at 1351; see supra Part III.A (for a discussion of Prometheus II in
greater detail).
59
See A.F.Y. Al Hadithy et al., Thiopurines in Inflammatory Bowel Disease:
Pharmacogenetics, Therapeutic Drug Monitoring and Clinical Recommendations, 37
DIGESTIVE & LIVER DISEASE 282, 282–83 (2005).
60
See Prometheus II, 628 F.3d at 1350.
61
Id. at 1351.
55
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ic for patent infringement.62 As a defense, the Mayo Clinic argued
that the Prometheus patent was invalid because of ineligible subject
matter.63 The district court found that the method patent was invalid,
but the Federal Circuit reversed (Prometheus I).64 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari in light of its Bilski decision,65 and the case was
vacated and removed to the Federal Circuit.66 On December 17, 2010,
the Federal Circuit reaffirmed its previous holding that the patent was
valid.67
The different outcomes reached in Prometheus at the district and
circuit levels are directly related to two common arguments against
granting patents on diagnostic methods. The next section will explain
these arguments.
III.

TWO COMMON ARGUMENTS
METHOD PATENTS

AGAINST DIAGNOSTIC

There are two common arguments against granting patents on
diagnostic methods. The first is that diagnostic methods may include
“laws of nature, natural phenomenon, and abstract ideas” (hereinafter
referred to as “general concepts”), which are commonly excluded by
patent law.68 The second is that granting patents on some diagnostic
methods may violate medical ethical standards. The first argument
has been of particular importance in recent judicial analysis,69 while
the latter has been influential but appears to have lost favor in the
Federal Circuit.70

62

Id.
Id. at 1351–52.
64
Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs. (Prometheus I), 581
F.3d 1336, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
65
See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218 (2010).
66
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 130 S. Ct. 3543
(2010).
67
Prometheus II, 628 F.3d at 1355.
68
See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (identifying three categorical exclusions from patent-eligible subject matter).
69
See Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3229 (Reaffirming the importance of applying the
traditional three exclusions when evaluating method patents: “In searching for a limiting principle, this Court’s precedents on the unpatentability of abstract ideas provide
useful tools.”).
70
See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124,
138 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting); but cf. Prometheus I, 581 F.3d 1336, 1346 & n.3
(2009) (“[Lab. Corp.’s] dissent is not controlling law and also involved different
claims from the ones at issue here.”).
63
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Preemption and the Exclusion of General
Concepts

When a diagnostic method requires use of the human body’s natural pathways or mental faculties, there are limited ways that this
method may be eligible for patenting.71 The patent laws tend to discourage any method that incorporates a concept or phenomenon
within the public domain. Consider, for example, if a patent was
granted on a diagnostic method with a step comparing the level of two
common metabolites (small, molecular products of metabolism) in
order to infer the presence of a disease.72 The patent holder (patentee)
would have a right to exclude the public from conducting any experiment that includes both steps. This overly broad patent would
preempt public use of the human body’s natural faculties by giving
the patentee the right to exclude in seemingly limitless scenarios that
involve comparing these two common metabolites and inferring that
there is a disease. Furthermore, future inventors would be deterred
from experimenting with these metabolites for fear that they may
somehow determine the metabolite levels, subconsciously infer what
the relative levels mean, and, as a result, commit patent infringement.
To justify patenting a diagnostic method that uses a general concept, one commentator has said that a necessary calculus should be
performed, weighing “the freedom and accessibility of knowledge and
ideas necessary to fuel creativity, while at the same time providing
enough proprietary control over the products of the knowledge and
ideas to provide economic incentives.”73 If a diagnostic method
involving a general concept was limited to a particular set of drugs or
conditions, or limited to diagnosis of specific diseases, the general
concept used in the method is necessarily less general and less likely
to “preempt” all future public use. Granting a patent on a more specialized application ensures that the general concept remains free to
the public, while also offering enough proprietary control to maintain
incentives to invent.
The prevailing judicial approach to analyzing whether preemption
of a general concept has occurred is a “holistic” utility test.74 In Dia71

See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185 (identifying three categorical exclusions from
patent-eligible subject matter).
72
This generalized example is similar to the method patent in Lab. Corp.
548 U.S. at 137.
73
See JEFFREY H. MATSUURA, JEFFERSON VS. THE PATENT TROLLS 10 (2008).
74
See Maureen A. O’Rourke, The Story of Diamond v. Diehr: Toward Patenting Software, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 217 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, eds. 2006) (Diehr’s holistic approach has since replaced the
substantive force of the previous tests for preemption).
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mond v. Diehr, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of a patent that
applied the Arrhenius Equation to an industrial rubber curing method.75 The mathematical equation was limited to a specific patenteligible process and did not preempt all future public use of the equation. While Diehr could have been interpreted narrowly as applying
only to industrial methods of transforming matter, such as curing rubber or molding metal, it has since been interpreted broadly,76 encouraging a finding of patent eligibility for all methods that apply general
concepts in a limited and “‘useful’ way.”77
The Diehr approach is more holistic than past tests for preemption
by requiring the patented method to be analyzed as a whole, rather
than by each separate step. Under Diehr, it is impermissible to evaluate the patent eligibility of a general concept alone once it has been
removed from its associated steps.78 A critical question to ask when
testing for preemption under Diehr is “[w]hat did applicants invent?”79 In Diehr, the court found that the patentee had invented a
useful method that applied the Arrhenius equation in a new context to
calculate and recalculate cure time associated with rubber production.80 Preemption analysis may only consider the invention as a
whole, which makes the overall utility and “feel” of the invention
more important. A finding of substantial utility decreases the chance
that a court will find preemption of a general concept and thus patent
ineligibility.
B.

An Ethical Dilemma: The Duty to Disseminate
Treatment Information and the Duty to Treat

Some diagnostic patents do more than block essential avenues of
research—they can also be unethical. One conflict arises from a failure to disseminate treatment information. Physicians have an ethical
duty to “advance scientific knowledge” by disclosing all relevant information to “patients, colleagues, and the public,” without considering financial gain.81 Physician patent owners who demand patent royalty payments from their colleagues violate this ethical duty.
75

Diehr, 450 U.S. at 177–79.
See O’Rourke, supra note 74, at 216; In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1583
(Fed. Cir. 1994); In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
77
State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368,
1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see O’Rourke, supra note 74, at 217.
78
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188.
79
In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 839 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
80
See O’Rourke, supra note 74, at 219.
81
AM. MED. ASS’N, AMA CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, THE PRINCIPLES (June
17,
2001)
[hereinafter
MEDICAL
CODE],
available
at
76
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Dissemination of Treatment Information: The
AMA Response & the Physician’s Immunity
Statute

The AMA has recognized the chilling effect that patents can have
on a physician’s ethical duty to disseminate new treatment methods to
his colleagues. In 1992 an ophthalmologist was granted a method
patent for performing cataract surgery without stitches.82 The ophthalmologist filed a patent infringement suit against another doctor
who was performing a similar surgery and asked for a small licensing
fee for each use.83 After the case attracted national attention, the
AMA released a policy statement condemning such patents as conflicting with a physician’s duty to disseminate new medical treatments.84 In 1996, Congress responded to the AMA’s concern by
amending the Patent Act to include the Physician’s Immunity Statute.85
While a step in the right direction, the physician’s immunity statute has not fully addressed the AMA’s concern that patents may hinder the dissemination of treatment information. First, the statute only
applies to “medical practitioners” who infringe on a patent during
“medical activity.”86 The statute defines medical activity as any
“medical or surgical procedure performed on a body,”87 and specifically excludes “the practice of a process in violation of a biotechnology patent.”88 Therefore, the immunity statute does not shield medical
professionals from liability when performing diagnostic methods. A
clinical laboratory physician who performs Myriad’s BRACAnalysis
test without a license would be liable for patent infringement. 89
http://www.utcomchatt.org/docs/AMA_Code_of_Medical_Ethics.pdf; see also Cynthia M. Ho, Patents, Patients, and Public Policy: An Incomplete Intersection at 35
U.S.C. § 287(c), 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 601, 624 (2000) (explaining that the
AMA’Medical Code of Ethics prohibits withholding knowledge for personal gain).
82
See Kesselheim & Mello, supra note 12, at 2037.
83
See Pallin v. Singer, 36 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1050 (D. Vt. 1995).
84
See Kesselheim & Mello, supra note 12, at 2037.
85
See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2011); see also Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Remedies
Under Patents on Medical and Surgical Procedures, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 789, 789 (1996); Jeff S. Rundle, The Physician’s Immunity Statute: A Botched
Operation or a Model Procedure?, 34 J. of Corp. L. 944, 945 (2009).
86
Mossinghoff, supra note 85, at 789; see Kesselheim & Mello, supra note
12, at 2037.
87
§ 287(c)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
88
Id. § 287(c)(2)(A)(iii).
89
See Kesselheim & Mello, supra note 12, at 2037; see Association for
Molecular Pathology, v. USPTO, 702 F.Supp.2d 181 (S.D.N.Y 2010).; see also Rundle, supra note 85, at 949–50 (2009) (“[A] physician is immune from infringement
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Commentators90 and the U.S. Congress91 have suggested that the physician’s immunity statute should be amended to expand coverage for
diagnostic methods.
2.

The Duty to Treat in Lab. Corp.: To Commit
Patent Infringement or Medical Malpractice?

A second conflict arises from the physician’s ethical duty to “regard responsibility to the patient as paramount.”92 In order to comply
with this ethical duty, a physician must order all diagnostic tests that
are important to a patient’s treatment. He may also have a legal duty
to the patient to order a test.93 But what if the test is patented? Should
the doctor have to choose between violating his duty or committing
patent infringement?
A Supreme Court case from 2006 has served as an ethical guidepost for plaintiffs challenging diagnostic method patent eligibility, due
to its strongly worded dissent.94 In Lab. Corp. v. Metabolite, a diagnostic corporation owned a method patent with two steps: (1) conduct
a blood assay to determine homocysteine levels, and (2) infer from the
homocysteine levels if a patent has a vitamin deficiency. 95 After analyzing the issues, Justice Breyer and two other justices argued in dissent that the diagnostic method preempted “a natural phenomenon”
between homocysteine and vitamin levels within the human body. 96
when performing a patented surgical procedure to prevent a birth defect in a fetus.
That same physician, however, may be subject to infringement liability for using
genetic screening to identify a birth defect and then using gene therapy to treat the
same condition without raising a scalpel so long as that gene is protected by a patent.”) (citation omitted).
90
See Kesselheim & Mello, supra note 12, at 2040.
91
See Genomic Research and Diagnostic Accessibility Act of 2002, H.R.
3967, 107th Cong. §3 (2002). Although it failed to pass, Section 3 of this Act would
have exempted medical professionals that use genetic diagnostic tests from patent
infringement.
92
MEDICAL CODE, supra note 81.
93
See Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp., 349 A.2d 245, 253 (Md.
1975) (holding that a physician owes a duty of care that a reasonable physician would
provide in the same class, acting under the same or similar circumstances).
94
Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124 (2006)
(Breyer, J., dissenting). Although this case was dismissed for an improvident grant of
certiorari, Justice Breyer felt compelled to decide it in dissent, explaining that “those
who engage in medical research, who practice medicine, and who as patients depend
upon proper health care might well benefit from this Court’s authoritative answer.”
Id. at 126.
95
Id. at 129. These are not the actual method claim steps. The actual steps
have been paraphrased for the sake of simplicity.
96
Id. at 135.
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The dissenting justices did not find an overall utility in the test, and
believed the correlation step to be impermissibly broad.97
Ethical considerations consume the rest of the Lab. Corp. dissent.
To further his argument that the diagnostic method at issue preempted
a natural correlation, Justice Breyer stated that the method was “invalid no matter how narrowly one reasonably interprets [the general
concepts] doctrine.”98 He also cited public policy considerations that
weigh against patent eligibility in this case, such as “inhibit[ing] doctors from using their best medical judgment,” and “divert[ing] resources from the medical task of health care to the legal task of
searching patent files for similar simple correlations.”99
The dilemma presented by Lab. Corp. can be summed up by an
example. Once a doctor orders a homocysteine assay for his patient
from the diagnostic company, he would infringe the company’s patent
if the results were used to diagnose a patient for vitamin deficiency. 100
However, in order to comply with his ethical and legal duty, a doctor
must treat the patient to the best of his medical knowledge. It would
be malpractice for the doctor not to consider vitamin deficiency as a
cause for elevated levels of homocysteine. This is an example of the
“legal catch-22” that currently “ensnares” physicians between one of
two options: patent infringement or medical malpractice.101
IV.

THE EFFECT OF PROMETHEUS LABORATORIES V. MAYO
CLINIC ON DIAGNOSTIC METHOD PATENT ELIGIBILITY
A.

The Path to Prometheus I: Uncertainty for
Diagnostic Method Patents

In March 2008 a diagnostic method patent similar to the one upheld in Lab. Corp. was invalidated in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of California. In Prometheus Labs, Inc. v. Mayo
Collaborative Servs.,102 the district court analyzed whether the Prometheus® Thiopurine Metabolites test preempted a general concept. The
test had three steps: (1) administration of a specific drug,103 (2) deter97

See id. at 136.
Id. at 135. The Abstract Ideas doctrine has been defined earlier as the
exclusion of general concepts. See supra Part III.
99
Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 138.
100
See Kesselheim & Mello, supra note 12, at 2039.
101
Id.
102
Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., No. 04-CV-1200,
2008 WL 878910, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008).
103
Id. at *5.
98
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mination of a metabolite level through a blood assay,104 and (3) warning105 the doctor to change drug dosage if the metabolite level was
above or below threshold values defined in the patent.106 Applying
Diehr’s holistic approach of preemption analysis, the district court
held that the test as a whole encompassed no more than “correlations
themselves.”107 The court approvingly cited Justice Breyer’s Lab.
Corp. dissent for this proposition. They also found the broad “inferring” step in Lab. Corp. and the “warning” step in Prometheus to be
similar.108
Those worried about the future of diagnostic method patent eligibility were troubled by the outcome of the district court’s Prometheus
decision.109 In the face of uncertainty about how the next patent eligibility case will be determined, one place to look for guidance is the
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO). In 2008 the USPTO held
a presentation entitled “A Look at Personalized Medicine.”110 The
presentation offered an example of one diagnostic method that was
clearly patent ineligible,111 and another that should be patent eligible.112 The ineligible method determined whether to treat breast cancer, using a two-step process: (1) “considering” data, and (2) “correlating” data.113 The eligible method was a treatment for breast cancer,
consisting of three steps: (1) obtaining a sample, (2) amplifying and
sequencing DNA isolated from the sample, and (3) treating the patient
with a breast cancer drug.114 A permissible inference to make from
this presentation is that diagnostic methods with patient treatment
steps are more likely to be patent eligible than methods that attempt to

104

Id.
Id. at *6.
106
Id. at *5.
107
Id. at *6.
108
Id. at *7–*8.
109
See Ronald I. Eisenstein & David S. Resnick, Personalized Medicine: IP
Under Attack, PHARMACEUTICAL, MEDICAL DEVICE & LIFE SCIENCES ALERT (Jan.
2009),
http://www.nixonpeabody.com/linked_media/publications/Pharma_MedDevice_Alert
_01_20_2009.pdf.
110
Kathleen Bragdon, A Look at Personalized Medicine, U.S. PAT. &
TRADEMARK
OFF.
1,
available
at
http://www.cabic.com/bcp/120308/KBragdon_PM.ppt (last visited Mar. 6, 2012).
111
See id. at 16 (discussing “Example 3: Methods Correlating SNPs and
Disease).
112
See id. at 17 (discussing “Example 4: Method of Treating Diseases that
Correlate with SNPS”).
113
See id. at 16.
114
See id. at 17.
105
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claim natural thought processes, or steps normally taken to analyze
data in the mind.
In September 2009, the Federal Circuit in Prometheus I115 reversed the district court’s holding of invalidity. The appellants argued
that the Prometheus Thiopurine Metabolites test comprised a “method
of treatment” despite the lack of this description in their issued patent.116 The Mayo Clinic argued that the Prometheus method did not
constitute a method of treatment, and amounted to no more than a
natural correlation, citing both the district court opinion and the Lab.
Corp. dissent.117 The court sided with Prometheus, holding that the
administering and determining steps were part of a transformative
method of treatment and “the addition of mental steps . . . does not
remove the prior two steps from that realm.”118 Applying Diehr’s holistic approach to preemption analysis, just as the district court had
done, the Federal Circuit found a useful method of treatment that applied a mental step.119
Prometheus I has been seen as a win for diagnostic methods.120
Nevertheless, this decision leaves much for concern. What effect will
the ethical considerations of Lab. Corp. have in the future? The AMA
has denounced Prometheus I for allowing a physician to become “an
infringer as soon as she makes the mental correlation between the test
results and the patient’s health.”121 Unfortunately, the AMA’s concern has fallen on deaf ears as the Federal Circuit dismissed Justice
Breyer’s opinion in Lab. Corp. as a nonbinding dissent.122 Also, why
should characterizing the Prometheus® Thiopurine Metabolites test as
a method of treatment change the result? The patented invention did
not change between the district and circuit level. It has always been a
method of optimizing a drug dosage to avoid toxic side effects rather
than a method of treatment.
115

Prometheus I, 581 F.3d 1336, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
The diagnostic method in Prometheus is directed to a method of optimizing thiopurine treatment and is not an obvious method of treatment on its own. Id. at
1340 (The preamble of claim 1 of the ‘623 patent reads “A method of optimizing
therapeutic efficacy for treatment of an immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder”).
117
See Brief of Appellant at 19 n.2, Prometheus Labs. Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (No. 04-CV-1200), 2009 WL 1399726.
118
Prometheus I, 581 F.3d at 1348.
119
See id.
120
See Dov Greenbaum, New Rules, Different Risk: The Changing Freedom
to Operate Analysis for Biotechnology, 11 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 139, 147 (2010).
121
Brief of Amici Curiae Am. Med. Ass’n et al. in Support of Respondents at
2, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (No. 08-964), 2009 WL 3199621.
122
See Prometheus I, 581 F.3d at 1346, n.3 (“That dissent is not controlling
law and also involved different claims from the ones at issue here.”).
116
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Bilksi v. Kappos: A “New” Test for Patent Eligible
Subject Matter

In June 2010 the Supreme Court, in Bilski v. Kappos,123 revisited
the question of patent-eligible subject matter for the first time in twenty-nine years.124 While all the potential ramifications of this decision
are beyond the scope of this Note,125 there are two parts that should
bear on medical method patent eligibility: the Court’s distaste for per
se exclusions,126 and a relaxed test for finding patent eligible subject
matter.127
In Bilski, the Court held that a business method for hedging risk
was ineligible for a patent because it preempted, or absolutely barred,
the public from using a general economic concept.128 In doing so, the
Court also reaffirmed the importance of conducting an analysis for
preemption of general concepts. The court stated that investigating
whether the public is barred from inventing with a general concept is
preferred to creating per se exclusions for certain types of inventions.129 This effectively keeps the subject matter inquiry broad under
§ 101.130 Bilski’s emphasis on not creating per se exclusions beyond
“laws of nature, abstract ideas, and natural phenomenon”131 means
that it is unlikely that a diagnostic method with a mental step (such as
“warning” or “inferring”) will be categorically barred from patent
eligibility in the near future. In fact, a doctrine that embraced this
categorical “mental step” exclusion was in effect forty years ago, but
has since been abandoned.132
123

Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3223 (2010).
The last time the Supreme Court visited 35 U.S.C. § 101 subject matter
eligibility was in Diamond v. Diehr. 450 U.S. 175, 177 (1981).
125
A third part of Bilski that bears on medical method patent eligibility is
Justice Stevens’s concurrence. See Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3231 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Stevens’s concurrence may signal a shift in the approach to the pre-emption of general concepts analysis. Stevens writes that the majority opinion “never provide[d] a
satisfying account of what constitutes an unpatentable abstract idea,” and appeared to
use an improper application of novelty and a surprising use of invention type to the
exclusion of general concepts. Id. at 3236. Stevens’s remarks are directed at the
majority’s comment that general concept exclusions should be used as a “‘tool’” to
set “‘a set a high bar’” when considering certain types of invention. Id.
126
See id. at 3228–29.
127
See id. at 3226–27.
128
See id. at 3231.
129
Id. at 3229.
130
See id. at 3229–30.
131
See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (identifying three categorical exclusions from patent-eligible subject matter).
132
Before the CAFC was established, the USPTO Board of Appeals and the
CCPA had developed the “mental steps” doctrine, which was used to deny patent
124
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Bilski is also notable for relaxing the test to determine patent eligible subject matter.133 Judicial analysis concerning patent-eligible
subject matter is performed in two steps: (1) analyzing whether
preemption of a general concept has occurred, and (2) applying the
machine-or-transformation test.134 While the purpose of the first step
is to find patent ineligible subject matter, the purpose of the second is
to discover patent eligible subject matter.
The machine-ortransformation test is satisfied when a method “(1) is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a
different state or thing.”135 The Federal Circuit held that the machineor-transformation test was a definitive test for patent-eligible subject
matter.136 The Supreme Court reversed this holding, bringing the machine-or-transformation test back to its roots as “a useful and important clue” towards finding patent eligibility, but not a dispositive
one.137
While Bilski involved a business method rather than a diagnostic
method, the decision should have comparable force as the Federal
Circuit formulates new limitations on diagnostic method patents.138
The Supreme Court has made it clear that a dispositive machine-ortransformation test is not fit for inventions in the “Information
Age.”139 New inventions are increasingly sophisticated, and applying
the same test can create uncertainty.140 Without providing specific
guidance, the Court went on to say that extra considerations must be
present when applying the machine-or-transformation test to emerging
fields such as “advanced medical diagnostic tests.”141 The Court has
not clearly stated what these considerations are and has entrusted the
Federal Circuit with developing them.
protection for process that could be performed in the mind. By 1970, the CCPA
adopted a broader view of patentable subject matter and discontinued the doctrine.
See O’Rourke, supra note 74, at 197–99; see also In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 893
(C.C.P.A. 1970) (“We cannot agree . . . that . . . claims . . . are directed to nonstatutory process merely because some or all of the claims therein can also be carried
out in . . . the human mind . . . . All that is necessary . . . is that [a process] be in the
technological arts.”).
133
See Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3231.
134
Id. at 3224.
135
Id. (citation omitted).
136
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
137
Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3226–27.
138
Id. at 3231 (expressly inviting the Federal Circuit to formulate new limitations on patentability).
139
Id. at 3227.
140
Id.
141
Id. The Court states that application of the machine-or-transformation test
to emerging technologies will pose questions of “intricacy and refinement.” Id.
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Prometheus II: A Second Win for Diagnostic
Method Patents

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Prometheus case in
light of Bilski’s change in rules for patent eligibility.142 The Prometheus I decision was vacated and the case was remanded to the Federal
Circuit.143 All eyes were on the Federal Circuit to interpret the Bilski
decision and impose extra limitations on medical method patents.
Many commentators believed that satisfying the machine-ortransformation test would serve as a safe harbor for patent eligibility.144 Others expected the Federal Circuit to come up with a new
test.145
On December 17, 2010, the Federal Circuit in Prometheus II reaffirmed its previous decision and allayed the fears of those concerned
about the future of diagnostic method patents.146 Noticeably swayed
by the purported utility of Prometheus Thiopurines Metabolites test,147
the court held that as a whole “Prometheus has claimed therapeutic
methods that determine the optimal dosage level for a course of treatment . . . [in] a series of transformative steps that optimizes efficiency
and reduces toxicity of a method of treatment for particular diseases
using particular drugs.”148 Once again, the court found that Prometheus’ test constituted a method of treatment, despite a lack of such
information in the method steps. The court was unpersuaded by Mayo
Clinic’s argument that the first two steps—(1) administration of a
drug, and (2) determination of metabolite concentration through a
142

Mayo Collaborative Serv. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 130 S. Ct. 3543

(2010).
143

Id.
See Eric K. Steffe & Michelle H. Holoubek, Diagnostic Testing in the
Wake of Bilski v. Kappos, IPWATCHDOG (July 2, 2010, 1:15 PM),
http://ipwatchdog.com/2010/07/02/diagnostic-testing-in-the-wake-of-bilski-vkappos/id=11474/; see also Brief of Amici Curiae Biotechnology Industry Organization et al. in Support of Neither Party at 32, Bilski, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (No. 08964), 2009 WL 2418478.
145
Courtenay Brinckerhoff, Catching a Breath After Bilski, PHARMAPATENTS
(June 28, 2010), http://www.pharmapatentsblog.com/101/catching-a-breath-afterbilksi/ (“On remand, the Federal Circuit is likely to decide whether these types of
methods cannot be patented because they claim a phenomenon of nature or abstract
idea. In doing so, the court may formulate a new test for the patent-eligibility of
diagnostic and personalized medicine methods.”).
146
See Prometheus II, 628 F.3d 1347, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
147
Kevin E. Noonan, Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative
Services
(Fed.
Cir.
2010),
PATENT
DOCS
(Dec.
20,
2010),
http://www.patentdocs.org/2010/12/prometheus-laboratories-inc-v-mayocollaborative-services-fed-cir-2010.html.
148
See Prometheus II, 628 F.3d at 1359.
144
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blood assay—are not “method of treatment claims no matter how
many times Prometheus repeats its Newspeak-like drumbeat that they
are.”149
In holding that the machine-or-transformation test had been satisfied, the court stated that “methods of treatment . . . are always transformative when one of a defined group of drugs is administered to the
body to ameliorate effects of an undesired condition.”150 The court
seemingly created a per se eligibility for methods of treatment involving drugs, which may be contrary to Bilski’s guidance that the rules
for patent eligibility should be relaxed and take into account new considerations.151 The court went on to say that the district court erred
when characterizing the first two steps as mere “data-gathering steps,”
rather than as transformative steps that are “a significant part” of the
diagnostic method.152 What makes the first two steps a significant
part of the method and not the last? The court attempted to justify
their significance based on the purpose of each step,153 however the
argument is not entirely convincing.154
D.

The Aftermath of Prometheus II: A Limited
Application or a Further Broadening of Patent
Eligible Subject Matter?

One commentator believes the Federal Circuit made a “dangerously subjective” policy argument in Prometheus II.155 The danger
presented by the court’s opinion is that subjectivity may taint the future of diagnostic method patent eligibility by giving undue weight to
an invention’s ability to serve as a patient treatment method. Are
Prometheus’ claims really drawn towards method of treatment, and
should all methods of treatment be transformative? The purpose of
the Prometheus Thiopurine Metabolites test is to optimize treatment
by administering a drug and determining metabolite levels through an
assay, which is arguably a diagnostic method that affects a method of
treatment rather than actually being a method of treatment itself. Can
149

Supp. Brief of Defendants-Appellees to Address the Effect of Bilski at 4,
Prometheus Labs. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs. 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (No.
2008-1403).
150
Prometheus II, 628 F.3d at 1356 (emphasis added).
151
See Bilski v, Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3227–28 (2010).
152
See Prometheus II, 628 F.3d at 1357.
153
See id.
154
Joshua D. Sarnoff, Patent Eligible Medical and Biotechnology Inventions
After Bilski, Prometheus and Myriad, 19 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L. J. 393, 400 (2011)
(citation omitted).
155
See Noonan, supra note 147.
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any diagnostic method that administers a drug to the human body for
treatment satisfy the test for transformation? The Federal Circuit
seems to go too far in Prometheus.156 Subjective evaluations of utility
and treatment may be given too much weight in overcoming clear
arguments against patent eligibility.
Inquiring into the USPTO’s guidelines may also help to explain
the outcome in Prometheus. After Bilski, the USPTO issued Interim
Guidelines for Determining Subject Matter Eligibility.157 The guidelines state that § 101 “is merely a coarse filter and . . . only a threshold
question for patentability.”158 This would indicate a broad scope for
eligible subject matter and a greater reliance on the other patent statutes to negate patentability.159 The Federal Circuit in Prometheus II
may not be saying that all methods of treatment using a drug should
receive a patent, but rather that diagnostic methods should not be invalidated at the eligibility level. The other statutory provisions offer a
better way to filter out inventions that hinder innovation rather than
promote it.160
V.

A REDEFINED TEST FOR TRANSFORMATION

Despite Bilski’s change to the application of the machine-ortransformation test, the Federal Circuit seemed to apply the test identically in Prometheus I and II.161 One concern is whether the Federal
Circuit has formulated extra considerations for the machine-ortransformation test, which in its previous form was ill-suited for “advanced medical diagnostic tests.”162 Another is whether any method
156

See Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, STAN. L. REV 1315, 1344
(2011) (“The Federal Circuit’s analysis . . . would allow too much.”).
157
Interim Guidance for Determining Subject Matter Eligibility for Process
Claims in View of Bilski v. Kappos, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,922 (July 27, 2010) [hereinafter
Interim Guide].
158
Interim Guide, 75 Fed. Reg. at 43,926.
159
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103, 112.
160
For example, if the patent document does not adequately disclose how to
make and use the invention, which is required under the enablement requirement of
35 U.S.C. § 112, the public cannot replicate and improve upon the invention, and
therefore do not benefit from issuance of a patent. Such a patent does not foster innovation and should not be granted. See also Interim Guide, 75 Fed. Reg. at 43926
(“Sections 102, 103, and 112 are typically the primary tools for evaluating patentability unless the claim is truly abstract . . . .”).
161
See Prometheus II, 628 F.3d 1347, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2010). (“We similarly
reaffirm that the treatment methods claimed in Prometheus’s patents in suit satisfy the
transformation prong of the machine-or-transformation test . . . .”).
162
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010). The Court in Bilski stated
that applying the machine-or-transformation test to emerging technologies will pose
questions of “intricacy and refinement.” Id.
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that treats a patient through administration of a drug can satisfy the
transformation prong.
To provide needed clarity in applying the machine-ortransformation test to medical diagnostic tests, the transformation
prong should be redefined. The redefined test for transformation allows for a more nuanced application of the current framework without
adding unnecessary limitations or per se exclusions.163 Redefining the
test for transformation is preferable to using new tests for patent eligibility,164 as it builds on the current analytical framework and adds just
enough additional inquiry to define “the line between a patentable
‘process’ and an unpatentable ‘principle . . . .’”165
Unlike the work of prominent scholars in the field, the redefined
test is not a test for creating presumptive subject matter exclusions, 166
or a test that attempts to justify patent eligibility in view of overall
utility.167 This redefined test for transformation challenges our perception of which scientific contributions involving natural pathways
are truly inventive, as opposed to those that are mere observations or
discoveries of a preexisting natural process. While this is not explicitly a sui generis test for transformative diagnostic methods, it is particularly useful for analyzing the patent eligibility of diagnostic methods
involving a multi-step physiological process (e.g., administering a
drug to a patient so that it may be broken down by the body, or extracting a sample from the patient and analyzing the result).
A.

A Proposed Test
--------

The redefined test for transformation test is satisfied by:
163

A redefinition of our current framework is preferable to proposing additional limitations. When new limitations are proposed, they must be aggregated with
old ones to remain relevant. A redefined test does not suffer from this aggregation
effect.
164
One such test involves a determination of the patent eligibility of differing
mental steps. See Andrew W. Torrance, Neurobiology and Patenting Thought, 50
IDEA 27, 28 (2009). Dr. Torrance proposes that certain method patents containing
unbounded mental steps could impose involuntary liability and should be presumptively ineligible for patenting. Id. By contrast, mental steps that can be controlled
within the mind are better suited patent eligibility. Id. See Lemley et al., supra note
154, at 1317, 1346 (proposing a “§ 101 overclaiming test” that renders a claim patentineligible when its scope is overly broad relative to its practical application).
165
Classen II, 659 F.3d 1057, 1078 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting Parker v. Flook,
437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978)).
166
See Torrance, supra note 164, at 28.
167
See Lemley et al., supra note 156, at 1317, 1329.
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A more than predictable transformation of an article into a different state or thing, wherein an article is a particular substance that is
smaller than the human body and is sufficiently removed from nature.
If the article is extracted from the human body, rather than provided
by an outside source, it must be imperceptible and assayable.
-------The proposed test for transformation tends towards different outcomes depending on whether an article is provided to the body from
an outside source, for example, the administration of a drug, or an
extraction from the body for subsequent analysis. The Prometheus
Thiopurine Metabolites test involves both the administration of a drug
to a patient and a subsequent determination step that measures the
concentration of a metabolite (product of drug breakdown). Myriad’s
BRACAnalysis test forgoes the initial drug administration step and
begins by extracting genetic samples from human tissue, then comparing and analyzing them.168 Administration of a drug to the human
body presents unique concerns as the natural pathways acting on the
administered drug are inherently transformative. Mere observation of
an inherent transformation seems too simplistic, and entirely noninventive, to constitute a patent eligible process on its own.169 By
contrast, determination steps performed on articles that have been
extracted from the body often require sophisticated transformative
steps in order to take them out of their natural bodily habitat and analyze the result.170
The following subsections will explain the redefined test for transformation, beginning with the more than predictable requirement.
This feature highlights what has already been considered by the Court
when evaluating the inventive jump required for a patent eligible process,171 and now makes it an express requirement for transformation.
168

USPTO v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 653 F.3d 1329, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Dan Hoang, Note, Prometheus Laboratories v. Mayo Clinic’s Gift to the
Biotech Industry: A Study of Patent-Eligibility of Medical Treatment and Diagnostic
Methods After Bilski, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 457, 470–71 (2011).
170
While there are inherently transformative natural pathways for extracting
an article, e.g. urination, extraction of a particular genetic sequence or metabolite
often requires sophisticated technical tests that cannot be performed without human
intervention.
171
The Supreme Court has considered whether natural products continue to
function in their normal predictable way during their patent eligibility analysis. See,
e.g., Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., in which the Court stated:
169

“Discovery of the fact that certain strains of each species of these bacteria can
be mixed without harmful effect to the properties of either . . . is no more than the
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The more than predictable standard arguably provides the greatest
“teeth” to the defined test for transformation.
B.

Raising the Transformation Barrier: The “More
Than Predictable” Standard

The current machine-or-transformation test is silent on the form or
amount of transformation required. In the physiology and pathology
fields, which routinely use diagnostic methods, the Oxford English
Dictionary (OED) defines transformation as “change of form or substance in an organ, tissue, [or] vital fluid.”172 This definition would
suggest that a transformation can occur within a region as large as a
bodily organ or as small as an extracted vital fluid sample. While
vital fluid in the aggregate is quite large, this definition is not limited
to a specific amount of vital fluid. Transformation is also defined in
the OED as “a complete change in character [or] condition.”173 A
“complete” transformation requirement would likely be hard to prove
or satisfy.
A compromise between complete transformation, which may be
too hard to prove, and no transformation requirement, which could
allow for incremental changes in form, would be a more than predictable transformation. A more than predictable requirement should be
imposed on diagnostic methods to prevent the patenting of obvious
tests that apply common drugs to natural pathways with known chemical reactivities. Natural pathways are inherently transformative and
predictably alter the composition of the drugs they encounter. While
the addition of a common drug to a well-known pathway may be
novel, it would not be inventive, as it would constitute a transformation no greater than those inherent within natural pathways,
transformative properties that are “free to all men and reserved excludiscovery of some of the handiwork of nature and hence is not patentable. The aggregation of select strains of the several species into one product is an application of
that newly-discovered natural principle. But however ingenious the discovery of
that natural principle may have been, the application of it is hardly more than an
advance in the packaging of the inoculants. Each of the species of root-nodule bacteria contained in the package infects the same group of leguminous plants which it
always infected. No species acquires a different use. The combination of species
produces no new bacteria, no change in the six species of bacteria, and no enlargement of the range of their utility. Each species has the same effect it always had.
The bacteria perform in their natural way. Their use in combination does not improve in any way their natural functioning. They serve the ends nature originally
provided and act quite independently of any effort of the patentee.”

Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948).
172
Oxford
English
Dictionary,
Online
Edition,
available
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/204743 (last visited Feb. 27, 2012).
173
Id.

at
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sively to none.”174 Patenting the addition of common drugs to natural
pathways provides little benefit to society, as it serves mainly to block
future inventors from utilizing the inherent transformative properties
of natural pathways for practical applications.175
1.

Scholarly Support for the More Than
Predictable Standard

Commentators have recognized the need to incorporate a measure
of creativity176 or technical sophistication177 into patent eligibility
analysis, particularly for products incorporating natural phenomena or
methods involving natural pathways. There are substantial incentives
to seek patents on applications of the human body’s natural pathways,
such as the NF-KB pathway involved in the expression of numerous
genes, and other vital signaling pathways at the crossroads of metabolic function.178 As a result, we can expect disputes over patent eligibility to continue. To avoid the dangers inherent in subjective assessments of utility or treatment ability to support patent eligibility, as
seen in Prometheus I and II, one commentator has suggested drawing
the patent eligibility line between technological innovations and mere
discoveries of natural phenomena.179 She argues that technical innovations are more likely to maintain traditional incentives to invent
than simple discoveries of natural processes, which are likely already
in the public domain and should remain there.180
174

Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130.
The district court in Prometheus found that alternate uses of the natural
phenomenon associated with the Thiopurine Metabolites Test were not practical uses.
Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., No. 04-CV-1200, 2008 WL
878910, at *1, *12 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008). There was no way to use the natural
phenomenon according to the claims without infringing on Prometheus’ patent. See
id.
176
See Sarnoff, supra note 154, at 417; see also Shengfeng Chen, Note,
Pathways to Patents: Applying the Written Description Requirement Doctrine to
Patents on Biological Pathways, 30 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 559, 561 (2008)
(claiming biological functionality through “reach-through” patents may “cast shadows on future developments”).
177
Elizabeth I. Winston, The Technological Edge, 3 AKRON INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 1, 8–9 (2011).
178
See Chen, supra note 176, at 564 (“Such biological pathways are perfect
candidates for functional claiming”).
179
Winston, supra note 177, at 17.
180
Id. (“The greater the technology required to discover problems in the art,
the less likely it is that such problems have already been discovered, and the greater
the benefit to the public of disclosing such problems and their solutions through the
patent system.”). There is language from the Supreme Court in Funk Bros to support
the proposition that mere discoveries of natural principles are not inventive and are
175
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These commentators’ suggestions to raise the patent eligibility
threshold support, at least to some degree, the creation of a more than
predictable requirement. However, unlike these commentators, I am
suggesting that the more than predictable requirement should define
the level of transformation required in the transformation test, rather
than serve as an extra consideration during preemption analysis.
Diehr’s “holistic” approach, which is used to analyze patent eligibility
in addition to the machine-or-transformation test, already suffers from
its own measure of subjectivity, as seen in Prometheus I and II. Analyzing the predictability of a method during transformation places a
requirement where one is noticeably absent and lends itself to better
resolutions of unclear patent eligibility cases.181
2.

Judicial Support for the More than
Predictable Standard: Judge Moore’s
Classen Dissent

On August 31, 2011, the Federal Circuit in Classen Immunotherapies v. Biogen Idec (Classen II)182 reversed its previous holding183
that a method for immunizing a patient that lowers the risk of chronic
immune-mediated diseases was ineligible for patenting. Classen’s
patent claims called for (1) screening a plurality of immunization
schedules, and (2) immunizing a patient according to a subject immunization schedule.184 The court held that the principles upheld in
Prometheus II, specifically “claims to methods of treatment . . . are
always transformative when one group of a defined group of drugs is
administered to the body,” supported the patent eligibility of Classen’s
transformative claims.185 The Court did not engage in any specific
analysis as to why immunizing a patient, as called for in step two of
Classen’s claims, was in fact transformative. The Court also cited
with approval Bilski’s guidance that § 101 is only a “threshold test”
and that substantive conditions of patentability (i.e., § 102 (novelty)

therefore ineligible for patenting. See Funk Bros., 333 U.S. 127, at 132 (“There is no
way in which we could call [this combination inventive] unless we borrowed invention from the discovery of the natural principle itself.”).
181
The current machine-or-transformation test does not define the amount of
transformation required - it is simply “transformation” of an article into a different
state or thing. See supra Part V.B.
182
Classen II, 659 F.3d 1057, 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
183
Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen Idec, 304 Fed.Appx. 866, 867
(Fed. Cir. 2008).
184
Classen II, 659 F.3d at 1060–61.
185
Id. at 1068 (citing Prometheus II, 628 F.3d 1347, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).
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and § 103 (non-obviousness)) should remain legally and practically
distinct.186
In a lengthy dissent reminiscent of Justice Breyer in Lab. Corp.,
Judge Moore criticized the majority for not analyzing why Classen’s
claims were transformative. She went on to say that Classen’s claims
“are not directed to any specific treatment steps or drugs or even any
specific chronic immune disorder.”187 Judge Moore felt that the intent
and effect of Classen’s claims were to stop others from using a natural
principle and destroy incentives to invent, citing approvingly Justice
Breyer’s Lab. Corp. dissent.188 She also indicated that any doctor
who wished to fulfill his or her duty to a patient by comparing patient
immunization schedules would also infringe Classen’s claims,189 leaving a choice between medical malpractice and patent infringement.190
Judge Moore’s dissent can be read to support the more than predictable requirement. Disagreeing with the majority’s analysis under
§ 101, Judge Moore proclaimed that “Classen did not invent the immunological response measured in his claim, and the discovery of this
phenomenon alone ‘cannot support a patent unless there is some other
inventive concept in its application.’”191 Judge Moore’s distinction
between mere discoveries of natural phenomena and a more inventive
contribution supports the concept of a higher patent eligibility threshold, similar to the suggestions of academic commentators.192 While
she does not explicitly endorse a more than predictable transformation
requirement, her analysis suggests that the court has applied the holding of Prometheus too broadly and has reduced the § 101 threshold to
an untenable minimum. A heightened standard for transformation
could address both of Judge Moore’s concerns.
3.

The Distinction between Predictability and
Obviousness

Critics of the more than predictable requirement would argue that
it conflates § 103, the statutory nonobvious requirement, with patent186

Id. at 1064.
Id. at 1076 (Moore, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
188
Id. at 1079 (Moore, J., dissenting) (quoting Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v.
Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 125, 127–28 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting from
dismissal of petition)).
189
Id. at 1078-79 (Moore, J., dissenting).
190
This is yet another example of the legal “catch-22” explained supra Part
III.B.2.
191
Classen II, 659 F.3d at 1079 (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594
(1978)).
192
See supra Part V.B.1.
187
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able subject matter analysis under § 101. They would also argue that
such a combined analysis of patent statutes is contrary to the approach
adopted by the Supreme Court in Bilski and the Federal Circuit in
Classen.193 However, the courts and the USPTO have clearly differentiated between what is “predictable” and what is “obvious.”194
Patent Examiners at the UPSTO are required to follow the Manual
of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) when evaluating a patent.
MPEP § 2144.08 states that “[o]bviousness does not require absolute
predictability; however, at least some degree of predictability is required.”195 When a court determines if a claimed feature is obvious, it
only needs to find evidence of “reasonable expectation of success,”196
whereas “predictability” suggests something more. Methods that are
predictable are undoubtedly obvious, however methods that are obvious are not necessarily predictable.
By setting the transformation requirement at more than predictable, we only inquire as to whether a natural pathway involved in a
method claim is so well-known and documented that the end state of
an article involved in a transformation is entirely predictable. By defining the requirement this narrowly, natural pathways that are firmly
planted in the public domain are withheld from patent eligibility,
while those that are less well-known remain free for commercial development and patenting.
C.

The Remaining Elements of the Proposed Test

To explain the remaining elements incorporated into the language
of the proposed test, I will compare the Prometheus decisions, which
involved a transformative method of optimizing thiopurine treatment,
with Classen I,197 in which the court held that a method for optimizing
an immunization schedule was not transformative.198 These elements
reiterate important distinctions that the Federal Circuit has already
drawn when analyzing the patent eligibility of diagnostic methods.

193
194

Classen II, 659 F.3d at 1064.
MANUEL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2144.08(II)(A)(4)(e) (8th

ed. 2001).
195

In re Rinehart, 531 F.2d 1048, 1053–54 (CCPA 1976).
In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 904 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
197
Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen Idec (Classen I), No. WDQ-042607, 2006 WL 6161856 (D. Md. Aug. 16, 2006), aff’d, 304 Fed. Appx. 866 (Fed.
Cir. 2008), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 3541 (2010) (emphasis added).
198
See Classen I, 2006 WL 6161856 at *5-6.
196
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An Article Smaller Than the Human Body

The redefined test for transformation should be limited to a defined range of articles. Prometheus I and II show that there is confusion about what constitutes a sufficient article for transformation. In
Prometheus I and II, the Federal Circuit held that the first two steps—
(1) administering a particular drug, and (2) determining the optimal
level of metabolites—satisfied the transformation test.199 While the
court seemed to identify the drug as the “particular article” and the
metabolites as “a different state or thing,” they actually identified another article. The court found a sufficient transformation “of the human body following administration of a drug and the various chemical
and physical changes of the drug’s metabolites.”200 The fact that the
court found both the human body and metabolites to be transformed is
shocking, as the human body is not usually considered an article. The
human body is much larger than a drug, organ, or other physical subdivision we might consider observing for a transformation.201
Comparison of the Prometheus decisions and Classen I shows that
transformation of the human body is not sufficient for a finding of
transformation. The Court in Classen I did not find the human body
to be a transformed article,202 as did the court in Prometheus. However, a transformation of the human body would have occurred after
administration of a vaccine. Injection of a vaccine triggers the human
immune system response and changes the body to “a different state or
thing.”203 The court in Classen I did not see this change in the body
as sufficient for overall transformation. While the recent decision in
Classen II upholding patent eligibility may cast this conclusion into
doubt, there is no indication in the majority opinion of what exactly is
being transformed, whether the human body or the injected vaccine.204
Regardless of the court’s hidden intent in Classen II, transformation of the human body alone should never be sufficient for a finding of transformation.205 This would imply that any process that
199

Prometheus I, 581 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Id. (emphasis added).
201
See supra Part V.B (identifying the OED definition of “transformation”).
202
See generally Classen I, 2006 WL 6161856 (The opinion does not mention
transformation of the body alone, although the body is arguably being transformed
after vaccine injection).
203
Id. at 3225 (citation omitted).
204
See Classen II, 659 F.3d 1057, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Moore, J., dissenting) (“None of this [transformation] analysis exists in the majority opinion here in
Classen.”).
205
Transformation should be limited to an article introduced into a process,
rather than the surroundings the article is placed into. At a certain level of abstrac200
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changes the state of the human body would satisfy the transformation
test, an important clue towards finding patent eligibility. Any immunization, blood sample extraction, or mild invasion of the body would
theoretically satisfy the transformation test if this was the current state
of the law.206
2.

The Article Should Be Particular and
Sufficiently Removed from Nature

The second conclusion reached by comparing the Prometheus decisions and Classen I is that the administered article must be particular. Prometheus I explicitly states that methods of treating the human
body are always transformative when administering a particular
drug.207 Classen I points out the lack of a “particular vaccine”208 in
the vaccination process. The “particular” limitation seen in both cases
is reasonable, as diagnostic methods tied to unique articles are less
likely to preempt the use of natural pathways. “Particular” means, for
example, a patented drug, or a defined class of chemotherapy drugs.
A non-particular drug would mean, for example, a pain pill, a cough
drop, or a general vaccine. In Classen II, the majority opinion’s neglect of this “particular” limitation was pointed out in Judge Moore’s
dissent.209
Comparison of the Prometheus decisions and Classen I also raises
new questions. Is there something inherently different between administration of a synthetic drug and a vaccine that would justify patent
protection for the former and not the latter? Two differences are
worth noting. A drug is typically an unnatural substance that chemically breaks down into metabolites that can be viewed through an
assay. A vaccine is typically comprised of killed or weakened natural

tion, any number of articles could be transformed within a process. See Kevin E.
Collins, An Initial Comment on Prometheus: The Irrelevance of Intangibility,
PATENTLYO (Sept. 17, 2009), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/09/an-initialcomment-on-prometheus-the-irrelevance-of-intangibility-1.html.
206
This could occur during either an “administration” step or a “determination” step.
207
Prometheus I, 581 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
208
Classen I, No. WDQ-04-2607, 2006 WL 6161856, at *5 (D. Md. Aug. 16,
2006), aff’d, 304 Fed. Appx. 866 (Fed. Cir. 2008), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 3541 (2010)
(emphasis added).
209
Classen II, 659 F.3d at 1078 (Moore, J., dissenting) (“No limitations exist
on the type of drug to immunize with, the schedules that should be used for the immunization, the type of chronic immune disorder to look for, or any limitation on the
control group.”).
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microbes210 that stimulate white blood cells and cause them to proliferate.211 Does it matter whether an article is entirely natural or synthetic, or how the article breaks down once inside the body?
Rather than emphasizing the distinction between natural and synthetic, the analysis should focus on whether the drug is sufficiently
removed from nature. Vaccines contain a small amount of protein
from a virus, however that protein is inactive and isolated though a
technological intervention.212 If a vaccine is sufficiently isolated to
the point that it becomes different “not just in degree, but in kind,”
then that would normally be enough to tie it to a patent eligible method.213
Regarding the mechanism of article breakdown, the court found
both the synthetic drug in Prometheus II and the partially natural vaccine in Classen II to be transformative.214 The Classen II court did
not provide any details indicating that article breakdown mechanism
is important.
3.

Imperceptible and Assayable

During a “determination step,” patent eligibility favors articles
that were once imperceptible, or could not be seen, and subsequently
become perceptible through an assay. In Prometheus I, the court stated that “determining the levels of [the metabolites] 6-TG or 6-MMP
in a subject necessarily involves a transformation, for those levels
cannot be determined by mere inspection.”215 The court presumed
that “some form of manipulation”216 is required to make an object that
210

Vaccines: What is a Vaccine?, NAT’L INST. ALLERGY & INFECTIOUS
DISEASES,
http://www.niaid.nih.gov/topics/vaccines/understanding/Pages/whatVaccine.aspx
(last updated Aug. 18, 2008); see also Winston, supra note 177, at 6.
211
DONALD VOET, JUDITH VOET, AND CHARLOTTE PRATT, FUNDAMENTALS OF
BIOCHEMISTRY: LIFE AT THE MOLECULAR LEVEL 209-10 (Wiley & Sons, Inc., 3rd ed.
2008) [hereinafter VOET & VOET].
212
See Vaccines: What is a Vaccine?, supra note 210.
213
See Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 103
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911) (purified adrenaline so superior to previous adrenal gland extracts so as to be distinct not in degree, but in kind). The method of injecting a vaccine however would still need to meet the more than predictable standard of transformation. It’s arguably very predictable to immunize the human body with an antigen during vaccination test, as the immunization relies on the inherent response of the
human body to the introduction of a foreign agent.
214
See Prometheus II, 628 F.3d 1347, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see Classen
II, 659 F.3d at 1068.
215
Prometheus I, 581 F.3d 1336, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
216
Id.
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cannot be seen into one that is visible. This indicates that visualization is a distinguishing feature of transformed articles in a determination claim. If an article was always visible, it is hard to imagine how
extraction from the body would change it into a different state or
thing.
D.

Application of the Proposed Test: Diagnostic
Methods in Recent Federal Circuit Cases

To consider what a more than predictable transformation would
entail, one could start with three common factors used in establishing
the level of ordinary skill in an art.217 Such factors include (1) “the
types of problems [normally] encountered in the art,” (2) “the sophistication of the technology [involved]”, and (3) the educational background of those working in the field.218 These factors will be considered in applying the proposed test to the Federal Circuit’s recent Prometheus II,219 Classen II,220 and Myriad221 opinions.
1.

Prometheus II

Application of the proposed test to Prometheus II leads to the
same result as the Federal Circuit, but for different reasons. The initial step, “administration” of the drug to a patient, is properly viewed
as a predictable transformation. The human body’s natural pathway
for metabolizing mercaptopurines and thiopurine nucleotides was well
known to scientists and the medical profession at the time the Prometheus Thiopurine Metabolites test was patented.222 The drugs were
commonly known for treating cancer and gastrointestinal disease.
The toxic byproducts of these drugs during patient metabolism were
also well known to those skilled in the field.223 Any transformation
undergone by the drugs would rely on the inherent reactivity of, for
example, the gastrointestinal tract in converting them into metabolites.
Therefore it is not an inventive application.
217

See AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N, AIPLA’S MODEL PATENT JURY
INSTRUCTIONS
§
7.3
(2008),
available
at
http://www.aipla.org/learningcenter/library/books/otherpubs/documents/2008_03_27_AIPLA_Model_Jury_Instructions.pdf.
218
Id.
219
Prometheus II, 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
220
Classen II, 659 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
221
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
222
See Sarnoff, supra note 154, at 401.
223
Id.
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The subsequent “determination” step, however, undergoes a more
than predictable transformation. Measuring the level of thiopurine
metabolites requires extraction of a human sample, such as red blood
cells, and sophisticated techniques to determine the concentration of
6-Mercaptopurine (6-MP) metabolites.224 The results of the assay are
not predictable—and that’s the very reason this assay is being performed. There is no natural pathway for extracting red blood cells
containing 6-MP that shows the predictability of this determination
method. The 6-MP metabolites are initially unnoticeable and are subsequently visible only after an assay.
The proposed test would therefore favor a finding of patent eligibility through a sufficient transformation at the determination step.
However, two other points are worth noting. First, contrary to the
Federal Circuit’s findings, transformation of the human body during
administration of the drug or during the determination of 6-MP metabolite levels would not be sufficient for transformation. Second, one
could argue that an individual’s metabolic response to common
chemotherapy drugs is variable, especially in this application, and
therefore the administered drug is more than predictably transformed.
However, every natural pathway operates at varying levels of efficiency depending on the individual and their health. To justify patent
eligibility over established natural pathways due to unforeseen natural
variations in activity would elevate formal distinctions over actual
effect—which blocks others from exploring the same natural pathway.
2.

Classen II

Application of the proposed test to Classen II would lead to a reversal of the Federal Circuit’s decision. Echoing the concerns of
Judge Moore in dissent, Classen’s immunization step involves the
predictable transformation of a vaccine to a proliferated immune response. Classen borrowed the inventive concept inherent within a
natural immune response, which is not rightfully theirs to claim. Natural processes such as immune responses reside firmly within the public domain, and any attempt to claim them would hinder researchers
and doctors from performing everyday tasks.
Unlike the patent at issue in Prometheus, Classen’s patent claim
involves only an “administration” step and lacks a “determination”
step. The inherent change in the human body after immunization is
also not sufficient to support a finding of transformation. Therefore,
the proposed test would favor a finding of patent ineligibility.
224

See U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 at [9] (filed Apr. 8, 1999).

2013]

THE PATENT ELIGIBILITY OF DIAGNOSTIC METHODS

3.

623

Myriad

In the case of Myriad, application of the proposed test leads to the
same result as the Federal Circuit, and for the same reasons. Since
Myriad’s BRACAnalysis test does not involve an “administration”
step, the proposed test for transformation would normally focus on a
“determination” step. However, Myriad’s patent claims do not include a determination step.225 Their patent claims include only “comparing” and “analyzing” nucleotide sequences. Therefore, these
claims attempt to control natural mental faculties that are firmly within the public domain.
If Myriad had claimed a “determination step,” which their kit is
designed for, this step would have involved a more than predictable
transformation of a human tissue sample into a purified and amplified
gene segment. This gene segment would subsequently be used for
comparisons between genes located within tumor and non-tumor samples after processing.226 In order to make this comparison, the gene
segments must be purified through sophisticated DNA isolation methods and extended through molecular medicine techniques. These
steps transform the genes by taking what is hidden within the body
and manipulating it into something markedly different from its natural
state.
CONCLUSION
This Note has discussed how to clarify the elusive line between
patentable processes and unpatentable principles by redefining the
existing machine-or-transformation test. Application of the redefined
test for transformation to current diagnostic method patent cases could
prevent the Federal Circuit from expanding the broad principles upheld in Prometheus—seemingly per se eligibility for diagnostic methods drawn towards treatment of the human body—to future patent
eligibility determinations. The redefined test may also be useful to
fight the Federal Circuit’s recent tendency to lower the § 101 thresh225

Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1357 (“Myriad’s claims, in
contrast, do not include the step of ‘determining’ the sequence of BRCA genes by,
e.g., isolating the genes from a blood sample and sequencing them, or any other necessarily transformative step.”).
226
See Brief for the Appellants at 55, Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v.
USPTO, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011)) (No. 2010-1406), 2010 WL 4600106. Extraction generally refers to gene isolation and amplification techniques. See VOET,
VOET & PRATT, supra note 209, at 62–65. Processed generally refers to nucleotide
sequencing. See id. at 53–55.
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old to minimal levels. A lowered § 101 threshold has arguably undermined traditional incentives to invent.227
The Supreme Court delivered its decision in Prometheus III228
sometime after completion of this Note. The Court reversed and held
the patent claims to be invalid.229 Justice Breyer authored the majority opinion and cited with approval many of the issues raised in his
dissent from the 2006 Lab. Corp. decision.230 While a full analysis of
this decision is beyond the scope of this Note, I would like to briefly
mention that the opinion arguably supports the proposed redefined test
for transformation.231 While such adoption is not explicit, and other
aspects of the opinion may instruct against a more searching transformation test requirement,232 the Supreme Court recognized that additional analysis under §101 is appropriate to avoid the unintended effect of diagnostic method patents in blocking critical avenues of research and treatment.

227

While a lower patent threshold makes it easier to obtain an exclusive right
and therefore may increase traditional incentives to invent, the lowered threshold may
also unduly interfere with the free flow of information by allowing for the creation of
too many exclusive rights. See Mayo Collaborative Serv. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305 (2012).
228
Mayo Collaborative Serv. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289
(2012).
229
Id. at 1305.
230
See, e.g., id. at 1302 (discussing how Prometheus’ patent claims “tie up the
doctor’s subsequent treatment decision” as well as inhibit the development of “later
discovered processes that measure metabolite levels in new ways.”)
231
The Court’s quick dismissal of Prometheus’ claims as involving inadequate transformations, acknowledgment that subject matter eligibility analysis under
§101 may involve overlapping concepts of novelty or obviousness, and detailed discussion regarding an “inventive concept” may support the proposed redefined test for
transformation. See, e.g., id. at 1289 (“We recognize that, in evaluating the significance of additional steps, the § 101 patent-eligibility inquiry and, say, the § 102 novelty inquiry might sometimes overlap.”); id. at 1303 (finding the “administering” step
in Prometheus’ claims to be an irrelevant transformation, and the second “determining” step to be “satisfied without transforming the blood, should science develop a
totally different system for determining metabolite levels that did not involve such a
transformation.”); id. at 1290, 1292, 1294, 1299, 1300 (discussing the importance of
an “inventive concept”).
232
See id. at 1289 (The Court cautions against mixing inquiries of novelty and
obviousness in subject matter eligibility analysis under §101).

